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 Internet auctions demonstrate that advances in information
 technologies can create more efficient venues of exchange
 between large numbers of traders. However, the growth of
 Internet auctions has been accompanied by a corresponding
 growth in Internet auction fraud. Much extant research on
 Carol Saunders was the accepting senior editor for this paper. Lucas Introna
 was the associate editor. Mike Chiasson and James Backhouse served as
 reviewers.
 Internet auction fraud in the information systems literature
 is conducted at the individual level of analysis, thereby
 limiting its focus to the choices of individual traders or
 trading dyads. The criminology literature, in contrast, recog
 nizes that social and community factors are equally important
 influences on the perpetration and prevention of crime. We
 employ social disorganization theory as a lens to explain how
 online auction communities address auction fraud and how
 those communities interact with formal authorities. We show
 how communities may defy, coexist, or cooperate with the
 formal authority of auction houses. These observations are
 supported by a qualitative analysis of three cases of online
 anticrime communities operating in different auction product
 categories. Our analysis extends aspects of social disorgani
 zation theory to online communities. We conclude that
 community-based clan control may operate in concert with
 authority-based formal control to manage the problem of
 Internet auction fraud more effectively.
 Keywords: Auction fraud, e-commerce, authority,
 communities, clan control, informal social control
 Introduction i^HBBI^Mi
 Internet auctions are among the most celebrated and suc
 cessful new business models of the emerging knowledge
 economy (Kambil and Heck 2002). eBay, the largest Internet
 auction house, has experienced exponential growth in
 customers, number of items sold, and gross merchandise sales
 since its incorporation in 1996 (eBay Inc. 2005). In 2005,
 eBay hosted over 181 million registered users and mediated
 over 1.6 billion trades worth more than $44 billion. However,
 growth in Internet auctions has been accompanied by a steady
 increase in fraud (National Fraud Information Center 2005),
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 making Internet auction fraud the leading source of Internet
 fraud (Bywell and Oppenheim 2001; National Fraud Infor
 mation Center 2003; Roth 2000; Snyder 2000). The Internet
 Fraud Complaint Center reported that 62.7 percent of fraud
 complaints were directly related to auction fraud (National
 White Collar Crime Center and Federal Bureau of Investi
 gation 2005). The National Consumers League reported that
 42 percent of all consumer complaints were related to Internet
 auction fraud (National Fraud Information Center 2004).2
 Researchers in information systems typically analyze Internet
 auction fraud at the individual level of analysis (e.g., Ba and
 Pavlou 2002; Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b; Hu et al. 2004).
 In studying the relationship between a buyer and seller,
 researchers focus on market mechanisms such as price or
 other signals that are employed to deceive victims, as well as
 authority-based mechanisms like the police and judiciary that
 expose fraud and prosecute con artists. However, research in
 criminology suggests that a focus on individual choice limits
 an understanding of criminal activity by ignoring the social
 context in which crimes are perpetrated and consequences
 manifested. In this paper, we expand current thinking about
 Internet auction fraud by using social disorganization theory
 to understand the role of online anticrime communities in
 managing Internet auction fraud. Our use of social disorgani
 zation theory in this context is novel because the theory
 originally focused on violent or physical property crimes in
 geographically bounded communities (Anderson 1999).
 Internet auction fraud occurs online, raising questions about
 the role of online communities in managing fraud. Our
 specific research questions are
 What mechanisms do online communities employ to
 manage Internet auction fraud?
 How do community responses to Internet auction fraud
 relate to, and interact with, responses by authorities?
 What practical implications can be drawn for the
 management of Internet auction fraud?
 We address these questions through a comparative case
 analysis of three auction-based online communities.
 Our research makes three primary contributions. First, we
 show that communities address fraud in ways that are substan
 tially different from the manner in which authorities address
 fraud. Authorities focus primarily on the establishment and
 The National Consumers League noted that reports fell after eBay stopped
 linking to it in 2003. It was estimated that if that link was still in place,
 auction fraud would constitute 71 percent of complaints.
 enforcement of rules. Communities, in contrast, are better
 able to monitor community activities and to detect criminal
 activity, often before actual crimes occur. Communities use
 the knowledge gained from monitoring to exert informal
 social (clan) control over crime. As predicted by social dis
 organization theory, the members most attached to their com
 munities are increasingly active in fighting crime. Second, we
 show that communities at different stages of development
 (dissatisfaction, resolution, and interdependence?see Nolan
 et al. 2004) have separate relationships with the formal
 control exercised by authorities. These relationships range
 from antagonistic in the dissatisfied community, to coopera
 tive in the interdependent community. As such, interde
 pendent anticrime communities display the greatest ability to
 maintain order through collective efficacy (Nolan et al. 2004).
 Third, we offer the practical conclusion that authorities should
 facilitate the process of community development by
 encouraging clan control and cooperating with community
 members in combating Internet auction fraud.
 Theoretical Background
 Fraud is defined legally as
 a misrepresentation or concealment with reference to
 some fact material to a transaction that is made with
 knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its
 truth or falsity and with the intent to deceive another
 and that is reasonably relied on by the other who is
 injured thereby (Merriam- Webster's Dictionary of
 Law 1996).
 Internet auction fraud is a broad category of crimes that are
 aided or abetted by participation in Internet auctions (New
 man and Clarke 2003). Although auctions may be seen as
 examples of pure market systems of exchange (Biggart and
 Delbridge 2004), the high incidence of fraud suggests that
 distortions exist in these otherwise efficient markets. Indeed,
 Internet auctions have been characterized as highly "crimino
 genic" environments, offering numerous opportunities for
 criminals to profit by deceiving unsuspecting victims (New
 man and Clarke 2003). In particular, Internet auctions permit
 stealth and reconnaissance because criminals can secretly
 observe auctions in progress and stalk their potential victims
 without detection. Internet auctions also afford anonymity to
 criminals who, like most Internet auction participants, operate
 under pseudonyms. Con artists using Internet auction sites
 can also escape from the scenes of crimes, leaving no physical
 evidence to trace them. Stealth, reconnaissance, anonymity,
 and escape are four of six criminogenic characteristics that
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 Table 1. Varieties and Victims of Internet Auction Fraud (adapted from Curry 2001)
 Type of Fraud Description _Harms_
 Shilling Seller's confederate bids on seller's auction to drive up its price. Buyer
 Bid shielding Two bidders collude on an auction. One bidder makes a low bid, while the Seller
 second makes an inflated bid that is withdrawn just before the auction ends. Other Bidders
 Misrepresentation Seller intentionally describes an item incorrectly. Buyer
 Fee stacking Seller adds hidden costs such as handling charges to the item after the Buyer
 auction ends. Auction House
 Failure to ship Seller never sends the purchased item. Buyer
 Failure to pay Buyer never sends payment. Seller
 Reproductions/ Seller advertises counterfeit goods as the real thing. Buyer,
 counterfeits Third Party
 Triangulation/fencing Seller sells stolen goods. Buyer
 Third Party
 Buy and switch Buyer substitutes delivered item with an inferior one for a fraudulent refund. Seller
 Loss or damage Buyer claims item was damaged and disposed of it. Buyer wants refund. Seller
 claims
 I Shell auction_ Seller sets up auction solely to obtain names and credit cards._| Buyer_
 increase the risks of fraud in electronic markets of all kinds
 (Newman and Clarke 2003).3
 Although buyers are victimized most often, Internet auction
 fraud can affect many parties. Auction houses can be cheated
 through lost fees (Kauffman and Wood 2005); sellers can be
 cheated through false payment (e.g., bad checks) and
 fraudulent credit card chargebacks; third-party merchants can
 lose merchandise; owners of property rights can have their
 rights diluted by counterfeits (Grossman and Shapiro 1988a,
 1988b); other sellers may lose customers through heightened
 perceptions of risk; and honest traders can have their reputa
 tions sullied by impersonators. Table 1 presents the major
 types of Internet auction fraud and identifies the individuals
 harmed.
 Previous IS research on Internet auction fraud has focused
 primarily on the individual level of analysis. Many studies
 have examined crime from the perspective of rational choice
 theory. These studies often urge changes to the rules and
 regulations governing Internet auctions with the aim of
 reducing incentives for engaging in fraud (Bywell and
 The remaining two characteristics are challenge (reflecting the hacker's
 ethic) and multiplication (the value of stolen information in enabling
 additional crimes).
 Oppenheim 2001; Roth 2000; Snyder 2000). Specific auction
 characteristics that have been studied include auction fees
 (Kauffman and Wood 2005), authentication (Ba et al. 2003;
 Wang et al. 2002a), escrow (Hu et al. 2004), shilling (Sinha
 and Greenleaf 2000; Wang et al. 2002b), trader reputation
 systems (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Bakos and Dellarocas 2002;
 Melnik and Aim 2002; Resnick et al. 2006; Standifird 2001),
 and warranties (Ederington and Dewally 2002). Other
 research at the individual level of analysis has examined
 decision processes in Internet auctions. For example, Grazioli
 explored deception across several studies (Grazioli 2004;
 Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Johnson et al.
 2001), and Pavlou and Gefen (2005) studied fraud from the
 perspective of psychological contracts.
 Although auctions may be seen as individual transactions
 between buyers and sellers, individual-level analyses of
 auction fraud typically ignore community influence over
 trading decisions. Within criminology, community structure
 and action are acknowledged as important influences on both
 the level and nature of criminal activity as well as community
 responses to crime. In these analyses, fraud and response to
 fraud are related to the physical, social, and economic condi
 tions in neighborhood communities. Residents living in close
 proximity to each other have both the motivation and capacity
 to respond actively against criminal activity, sometimes in
 cooperation with formal authorities. Although Internet auc
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 tions are conducted online rather than in physical neighbor
 hoods, they also manifest community characteristics that have
 been neglected in the IS literature (for exceptions, see Chua
 and Wareham 2002, 2004). In the following section, we
 describe one theory of community action, known as social
 disorganization theory, which appears adaptable to the study
 of community responses to fraud in Internet auctions.
 Social disorganization theory argues that crime occurs when
 communities are weak and disorganized, and that more
 developed communities can deter crime effectively. In its
 original form, social disorganization theory postulated that the
 root causes of crime were economic disadvantage and
 residential instability caused, in part, by large migrations of
 populations (Shaw and McKay 1942). Modern versions of
 the theory expand this original conception to include the
 impact of residential culture on crime (Anderson 1999;
 Sampson et al. 2002; Triplett et al. 2003). For example,
 research examines how respect is earned in communities and
 how respect affects criminality (Bourgois 1996). Thus, ven
 detta killings, which often have little economic benefit, are
 enacted because the community approves of them as "codes
 of the street" (Horowitz 1983). Similarly, some communities
 in high-crime regions have low crime rates because stealing
 from members of one's own community is considered socially
 unacceptable (Brewer et al. 1998).
 Social disorganization theory focuses not only on community
 regulation of criminal activity, but also on the development of
 communities and their relationships with authorities in efforts
 to combat crime. In many cases, community regulation pro
 duces more effective results than regulation by formal
 authorities such as police. For example, evidence indicates
 that neighborhood watch programs initiated by government
 officials work less effectively than those initiated by commu
 nity leaders (Bennett 1995). Indeed, anticrime communities
 often form when authority-based control is ineffective or even
 implicated in the perpetration of crime. For examples, Brewer
 et al. (1998) describe how paramilitary groups enforced law
 and order in areas of Belfast where official police feared to
 tread, and Hill (2004) reports multiple cases where environ
 mental action communities formed because government
 agencies dumped hazardous waste illegally in community
 living areas.
 Social disorganization theory is appropriate for the study of
 Internet auction fraud for several reasons. Although social
 disorganization theory originated over 60 years ago,
 researchers within criminology still use it to examine the
 effects of community on crime (for reviews, see Bursik 1988;
 Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Triplett et al. 2003). Most other
 criminological theories focus on the power of authority
 (Foucault 1977) or the motivations of criminals (Cornish and
 Clarke 1986). Although some theories focus on the influence
 of social conditions on crime, using concepts such as anomie
 (Merton 1938) and social control (Hirschi 1969) to explain
 deviant behavior, most social theories of crime are individual
 level (Bursik 1988). By contrast, social disorganization
 theory focuses directly on the community.
 We extract three main ideas from social disorganization
 theory: (1) neighborhood attachment as a motivation for com
 munity responses to crime; (2) the stages of community devel
 opment; and (3) the distinction between formal (authority
 based) control and informal (clan) control.
 Neighborhood Attachment. A central argument in social
 disorganization theory is that the strength of informal social
 controls that communities apply to reduce crime is positively
 related to the degree of attachment that members of a
 community feel toward their neighbors and their physical
 locality (Silver and Miller 2004). If a substantial proportion
 of individuals intend to reside within a community for a long
 time, then anticrime communities are more likely to form. If
 most individuals are transient, anticrime communities are less
 likely to form (Taylor 1996). Victimization of community
 members moderates the relationship between attachment and
 the formation of anticrime communities. Thus, victims who
 intend to stay tend to fight crime more aggressively, while
 victimized transients hasten their exit (Woldoff 2002).
 Social disorganization theory focuses primarily on the attach
 ment of community members to the physical neighborhood
 (Sampson and Groves 1989). In contrast, proponents of the
 concept of social capital in communities are more likely to
 emphasize the strength of social relationships in the com
 munity (e.g., Adler and Kwon 2002). Social disorganization
 theory argues that even members with weak social relation
 ships may contribute to anticrime efforts if their presence in
 the community is of sufficient duration. Thus, social dis
 organization theory predicts that a long-term resident with
 nowhere else to go would participate in anticrime activities
 when crime increases simply because the alternative is a
 reduction in the quality of the resident's environment.
 Community Development. Social disorganization theory
 argues that anticrime communities develop through four
 stages, summarized in Table 2, each involving a different
 relationship with authorities in controlling crime (Nolan et al.
 2004). The first stage is dependence, in which community
 members depend upon authority for managing crime instead
 of managing it themselves. In the second stage, dissatis
 faction, authority demonstrates its inability to manage crime
 and community members take matters into their own hands.
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 Table 2. Stages of Community Development
 Stage No. Stage Name Characteristics
 1 Dependence Community does not react to crime. Community members feel that dealing with crime is
 the responsibility of authorities.
 2 Dissatisfaction Community is hostile to and comes into conflict with both criminals and authority. In
 some dissatisfied communities, community members break laws to fight crime (e.g., by
 assaulting criminals). Others attempt to harm authority (e.g., with lawsuits or complaints
 of incompetence).
 3 Resolution Community is hostile to criminals. Community relationship to authority varies between
 hostility and cooperation. Community does not establish a lasting cooperative
 relationship with authority.
 4 Interdependence Community is hostile to criminals. Community relationship with authority is cooperative.
 Community exhibits a high degree of collective efficacy.
 The third stage is resolution, in which community members
 begin to trust authority and recognize authority's benefits for
 managing crime. The resolved community begins to supple
 ment existing authority-based mechanisms, but does not fully
 cooperate with authority (Kane 2002). The final stage is
 interdependence, where authority and community recognize
 each others' particular strengths and work hand-in-hand to
 manage crime. In interdependent communities, authorities
 and communities negotiate and define their respective roles
 and relationships with each other. Authorities may, for
 example, facilitate the efforts of community members to
 police themselves and intervene only when community action
 is insufficient. Nolan et al. (2004) regard the interdependent
 community as having the highest degree of collective effi
 cacy, defined as the cohesion among residents and their
 shared expectations for social control of public space.
 According to social disorganization theory, not all com
 munities achieve the collective efficacy manifest in the final
 stage of interdependence; some remain in an earlier stage of
 development. A community remaining in the dependence
 stage continues its dependence on authority, and chooses not
 to intervene when a crime is committed. A community
 remaining in the dissatisfaction stage creates mechanisms that
 bypass authority and often comes into conflict with authority.
 The community often usurps authority's monopoly on the use
 of physical force to punish malfeasance. For example, com
 munities in the dissatisfaction stage might exercise control
 over crime with paramilitary groups, financed with protection
 money paid by community members. A community re
 maining in the resolution stage would increase its efficacy by
 demonstrating fewer signs of conflict and cooperate more
 with authority. However, the resolved community fails to
 integrate its efforts fully with authority. Communities of
 illegal i igrants are often in the resolution stage. They are
 reluctant to cooperate with police investigations out of fear of
 depor ation or other punishments, but assume informal
 respon ibility to socialize members and inculcate them with
 moral codes of conduct (Brewer et al. 1998; Nielsen et al.
 2005; Osg od and Anderson 2004).
 Formal and Informal Control. The literature on social
 disorgan zation theory suggests that authorities and commu
 nities manage criminal activity in distinct ways. Authorities
 grant thei  agents the right to use force to restrain suspected
 cri i als. In contrast, communities influence individuals
 through i formal, clan-like social relationships and trust
 (Ad er 2001). Clan and formal controls may either comple
 m  or contradict each other. Professional codes of ethics,
 for example, are often developed to guide professional con
 duct informally by complementing the "letter of the law"
 (Davis and Neal 1998; Matthews 1991; Shaked and Sutton
 1981). However, communities may also sanction violations
 of laws that are perceived as discriminatory or impractical
 (Kane 2002).
 This emphasis on formal and informal control aligns well with
 the literature on governance of economic exchange, which has
 long recognized clans as self-governing entities, along with
 markets and hierarchies of authority (Adler 2001; Kirsch
 1997; Ouchi 1980; Williamson 1975). In the context of auc
tion fraud, both communities and authorities might comple
 ment each other's effor s to cope with the criminogenic nature
 of Internet auction markets. However, Adler (2001) states
 that he relationships among community, authority and mar
 kets is ambiguous: the modes of governance "are sometimes
 complements and ometimes substitutes" (p. 221). This ambi
 guity is addressed in social disorganization theory's specifi
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 cation of stages of development, which manifest varying
 states of conflict and cooperation between communities and
 authority.
 Social disorganization theory is not without its limitations and
 critics (Bursik 1988; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Three con
 cerns raised in the criminology literature pertain specifically
 to our study. First, community control may be associated
 with both the increase and reduction of crime. For example,
 "codes of the street" may encourage particular forms of crime
 that are seen as helping the community, while discouraging
 other forms that damage it (Horowitz 1983). As one instance,
 stealing from neighbors might be regarded as socially im
 proper, while stealing from nonresidents (e.g., tourists) might
 be seen as consistent with community interests. Thus, it is
 important for research to carefully assess community values
 instead of assuming that communities always help in nominal
 crime reduction (Brewer et al. 1998; Silver and Miller 2004).
 Second, community-level controls function in an environment
 where authorities already exist. Thus, it is important to situate
 community controls within the context of the community's
 relationship with authority (Carr 2003). Third, studies in
 social disorganization theory are often criticized for defining
 communities based on arbitrary divisions (e.g., voting blocks),
 without recognizing that actual communities may not corre
 spond to those divisions. Thus, community researchers
 should collect and analyze community-level data where
 possible.
 In summary, three aspects of social disorganization theory are
 central to our analysis of the management of Internet auction
 fraud: neighborhood attachment, stages of community devel
 opment, and relationships between formal authority and clan
 control. Despite social disorganization theory's original focus
 on geographically bounded communities, we extend these
 concepts to analyze online communities involved in Internet
 auctions. Our research method involves qualitative analysis
 of three anticrime communities at different stages of
 development.
 Method
 Most research on Internet auctions uses quantitative data
 collected from auction web sites (e.g., Ba and Pavlou 2002;
 Kauffman and Wood 2005; Livingston 2002; Lucking-Reiley
 et al. 2000). We employ a qualitative approach that offers
 rich detail on community roles in fighting crime. Results of
 qualitative research may complement findings from quanti
 tative studies, thereby strengthening research conclusions
 about Internet fraud (Lee 1991; Mingers 2001). Fraud is
 difficult to assess quantitatively because fraudulent traders
 usually mimic legitimate ones. Objective reports of fraud
 may also be understated because victims are often unaware
 that they have been victimized, or choose not to report fraud
 to official sources. However, experienced traders are aware
 of the presence of fraud and are willing to discuss it publicly
 in Internet forums, as well as privately in interviews. Our
 research relied on such sources to gain an intensive view of
 fraud and the mechanisms used to combat it.
 Our use of qualitative techniques also enables us to address
 several limitations in previous research, reviewed earlier,
 using social disorganization theory. Specifically, we explore
 the nuances of the relationship between community values
 and crime, thereby showing how communities both promote
 and reduce crime. For example, our study of Vigilantes
 reveals a community that simultaneously violated auction
 house rules while attempting to evict con artists from the
 trading community. We also overcome concerns regarding
 the operation of clan controls in an environment where
 authorities simultaneously exert formal control. Indeed, the
 relationship between community and authority is one of our
 primary research interests. Finally, rather than using census
 or other proxy data to estimate community characteristics, we
 examined communities directly by observing community
 activities and interviewing community members.
 Data Sources
 Data for this study originate from a larger study of auction
 fraud that was initiated in 2002 and completed in 2005. Data
 on Internet auction fraud were obtained primarily from
 publicly available sources on Internet sites. We searched for
 the term "auction fraud" on six sites: AltaVista, Google, and
 Yahoo (to identify web pages and articles), the eBay and
 Yahoo discussion forums, and Google groups. Because our
 searches were conducted manually (without the use of auto
 mated robots), they generated negligible load on websites
 designed for public access, so no special permissions were
 sought from website owners (Allen et al. 2006). Snowball
 sampling (Kuzel 1992) was employed to identify additional
 articles and postings using keywords associated with fraud.
 For example, as we learned more about the auction com
 munity, we searched using specific terms such as "Jay
 Nelson" (a well-known con artist), "IFCCFBI" (the Internet
 Fraud Complaint Center), and "escrow." Refinements in the
 search led to other sites and postings, such as the eBayExodus
 web ring (now defunct), fraud.org (maintained by the
 National Consumers League), Auction Watch (an auction
 community), the Online Auction Users Association (now
 defunct), and eSafe2Bid (an auction security software). In
 summary, public documents included
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 Table 3. Sources of Data
 Source Quantity
 Bulletin Board Postings
 Usenet News 605
 Auction Watch 238
 Online Auction Users Association 177
 Auction BBSes 362
 Paypal Warning BBSes 294
 StampChat 109
 Trader Lists 218
 Websites 14
 Interview Subjects 9
 News Articles 112
 Government/Official Sources 21
 Fraudulent Auctions Viewed 50
 Personal Records of Interviewees 9
 Web Pages Devoted to Auction Fraud. These included
 official web pages such as those of the National Con
 sumers League, as well as personal web pages of experi
 enced traders who offered advice about fraud.
 Bulletin Board Postings. These included postings on the
 bulletin boards of major Internet auction houses (e.g.,
 eBay, Yahoo), on UseNet news (archived on Google
 groups), and postings on bulletin boards of auction
 communities (e.g., Online Auction Users Association,
 paypalsucks.com, Auction Watch).
 News Articles. Sources included general news outlets
 like CNN and The New York Times, and specialized
 sources such as PCWorld and CNet Central.
 Because most of our data were obtained from publicly
 available sources, a substantial portion of it can be retrieved
 through an Internet search employing the quoted text as a
 search string. It is therefore possible to validate our data
 sources by accessing them directly. In qualitative research,
 this form of measurement validity is referred to as objectivity
 or confirmability (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 278).
 Unfortunately, data gathered from websites and bulletin
 boards that became defunct, or whose archives were erased,
 cannot be retrieved. Such data is available from the authors
 upon request.
 Once these sources were exhausted, we posted requests for
 information to several electronic bulletin boards and news
 groups. Various people expressed interest in our work, and
 we conducted e-mail interviews. Respondents directed us to
 specific fraudulent auctions, which w  monitored to observe
 interference by community members. Finally, we conducted
 semi-structured interviews via e-mail with nine traders who
 observed or actively fought fraud. We posed questions in an
 open-ended fashion that encouraged respondents' elaboration.
 In some cases, individuals provided private documents
 describing interactions with con artists and victims. Table 3
 summarizes our data sources. Overall, more than 2,000 docu
 ments were obtained, ranging in type from individual bulletin
 board postings to web pages.
 Sample
 For this paper, we analyzed data originating from three speci
 fic anticrime communities: Vigilante, Stamp Collectors
 Against Dodgy Sellers (SCADS), and Traderlist.com. Each
 of the three represents a specific stage of community
 development in social disorganization theory (Nolan et al.
 2004). Table 4 summarizes the three cases.
 We selected cases based on three considerations. First, the
 c ses needed to match one of th  st ges identified in social
 disorganization theory. Of course, no individual case is likely
 to match the description of any stage perfectly. For example,
 some community members in an interdependent community
 could oppose authority, and some members in a dissatisfied
 MIS Quarterly Vol. 31 No. 4/December 2007 765
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 Table 4. Case Summaries
 Stage of Trading
 Case Development Community Description
 Vigilante Dissatisfaction High priced Community members identify suspected fraudulent auctions. Mem
 Community consumer items bers interfere with and spoil auction. Many mechanisms employed to
 spoil auction are against auction house rules. The deliberate viola
 tion of rules makes this a dissatisfied community.
 Stamp Resolution Stamp traders Community members identify fake or altered stamps. Community
 Collectors members post warnings of fraud on website, with detailed explana
 Against tion of how fraud is occurring. Community members do not alert
 Dodgy Sellers authority. Community members do not disrupt auction. The un
 (SCADS) willingness of community members to both break rules and enter into
 prolonged dialog with authority makes this a resolved community.
 Traderlist.com Interdependence Beanie toys Community members authenticate beanies. Community members
 also aggregate fraud complaints and engage in mediation and
 dispute resolution. When dispute resolution fails, community mem
 bers forward information to police. The close relationship between
 the community and law enforcement makes this an interdependent
 community.
 community could cooperate with authorities. Nolan et al.
 (2004) argue that communities should be categorized based
 on the stage in which the community spends the most time.
 Our data show that the majority of Vigilante, SCADS, and
 Traderlist community actions exhibited signs of dissatis
 faction, resolution, and interdependence, respectively. We
 intentionally excluded cases representing the dependence
 stage of social disorganization theory. Communities at the
 dependence stage depend exclusively on authority to control
 crime, implying that very little community activity is devoted
 to crime prevention. It follows that one cannot observe the
 anticrime activities of communities in the dependence stage.
 Second, the three cases needed to be prominent in the fight
 against auction fraud. All of the anticrime communities
 selected for study were prominent either in terms of public
 notoriety (Vigilante) or community activism (SCADS and
 Traderlist).
 Third, we required access to individual members in each case
 and were able to establish contact with members from each of
 the three communities. Members of the Vigilante community
 provided us with private correspondence among themselves
 and between the Vigilantes and con artists. Similarly, we
 were contacted by SCADS members who provided samples
 of their personal analyses of fraudulent activity. Finally, we
 interviewed the founder of Traderlist.
 In defining anticrime communities as cases, we recognize that
 the boundaries of online communities participating in Internet
 auctions are different from geographic boundaries separating
 neighborhoods. In neighborhoods, community members live
 in the same area, and crime watchers patrol a bounded set of
 streets and homes. Members of online auction communities
 are free from geographical constraints and able to move their
 activities into different trading areas. For example, a collector
 of Ty beanie toys may participate not only in eBay, but in
 other Internet markets.
 To clarify the issue of community boundaries, we defined two
 levels of community: the broader trading community, whose
 members traded in a particular class of merchandise, and the
 anticrime community, which operated within the trading com
 munity. The anticrime community, which is the main focus
 of this paper, was composed of trading community members
 who expended effort to reduce or ameliorate the effects of
 crime. Both of these communities differed from the auction
 houses, which operated as authorities that created and en
 forced the rules of trading. To clarify the distinction among
 these three entities, we use the following terms throughout the
 paper:
 trading community: refers to the broader community
 trading in a specific commodity (i.e., high-priced con
 sumer items, stamps, and beanie toys)
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 community, or anticrime community: refers to the anti
 crime community within the larger trading community
 (i.e., Vigilantes, SCADS, and Traderlist.com)
 authority: refers to the auction house (i.e., eBay, Yahoo)
 Data Analysis
 Data were analyzed using the lens of social disorganization
 theory. To answer our research questions, we focused on the
 issues of clan control, attachment, and relationships between
 communities, authorities, and criminals. We focused on clan
 control because of the theoretical distinction between clan
 control and formal control. We focused on attachment be
 cause it is a central theme in social disorganization theory;
 community members that remain attached to their commu
 nities fight crime more actively. Finally, we focused on rela
 tionships between communities, authorities, and criminals to
 better understand the differences in these relationships across
 the stages of community development identified in the theory.
 Clan control. Clan control was assessed through a content
 analysis of bulletin board and website messages. The analysis
 identified more than 60 distinct ways of addressing more than
 30 separate kinds of fraud. The content analysis also iden
 tified controls employed by market activity and auction house
 authorities. Inter-rater agreement between the two authors
 who coded the data was measured using Cohen's kappa,
 which compensates for the possibility of agreement by
 chance. Kappas ranged from 0.6 to 0.8, where 0.6 is con
 sidered acceptable, and 0.8 is considered almost perfect.4
 Attachment. All three cases had existed for a number of years
 prior to data collection. In many instances, messages were
 dated and/or time-stamped, making it possible to ascertain the
 approximate length of time that members of the anticrime
 community had been active. Interview subjects also fre
 quently mentioned the duration of their tenure in the anticrime
 community and the trading community.
 Relationships with authority. Data were analyzed to discern
 the quality of the relationship between community and
 authority. For example, we reviewed postings on bulletin
 boards and interviews in the popular press to determine
 whether members wrote derogatively or respectfully of
 authority. Uses of expletives, emoticons, and punctuation
 provided cues for interpreting cooperative, distant, and
 antagonistic relationships.
 Detailed descriptions of the types of controls are beyond the scope of the
 paper. Readers may contact the first author for more details.
 Relationships within the trading community. Our data origi
 nated not only from anticrime community sources, but also
 from the broader trading communities. For example, we
 obtained data on Vigilantes not only from the Vigilante
 discussion group, but also from auction bulletin boards.
 Likewise, SCADS data came not only from SCADS members,
 but also from stamp discussion forums on Google. Similarly,
 Traderlist data came not only from the Traderlist website, but
 also from postings to other bulletin boards. It was therefore
 possible for us to judge how members of the trading com
 munity who were not involved in fighting fraud viewed the
 anticrime community.
 Relationships with criminals. We reviewed data to ascertain
 both members' attitudes toward criminals, as well as cri
 minals' responses. Some Vigilantes showed us death threats
 sent by criminals. In the SCADS and Traderlist communities,
 criminal responses were documented on websites. Under
 standing the response of alleged con artists allowed us to
 explore the causal relationship between crime and attachment
 of the anticrime community.
 Ethical Considerations
 Along with legal principles regarding research that gathers
 data from commercial Internet sites (Allen et al. 2006), ethical
 principles for research on online communities have also been
 proposed (Ess 2007; Jones 1999). Two concerns specific to
 our research include sensitivity to the privacy of individuals
 contributing public data that might be used for research
 purposes, and informed consent (King 1996). In contrast to
 the oral cultures of geographically bounded communities,
 communication in online communities is archived and acces
 sible for research use at relatively low cost. Because many
 members of online communities may be unaware that their
 postings could be used for research purposes, and therefore
 may reveal their true identities, researchers need to exercise
 care to protect member privacy. For example, it would be
 inappropriate to reveal the identities of individuals posting
 questions on public forums seeking assistance for psy
 chological depression (King 1996). In such situations,
 researchers should assess the perceived privacy that members
 of an online community experience. When perceived privacy
 is assessed as high, researchers should not reveal the identity
 of those communicating sensitive information.
 In our study, we assessed the perceived privacy of Internet
 auction participants to be low. Auctions occur in public
 venues where most traders intentionally mask their true iden
 tities with a pseudonym. Contributors to community bulletin
 boards generally know that comments are archived and
 retrievable by anyone with a user account. For these reasons,
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 Table5. Summary of Case Analysis
 Vigilante SCADS Traderlist.com
 Attachment of Members Strongly attached Strongly attached Strongly attached
 Clan Control Vigilantes maintain history of SCADS members are frequent Traderlist members maintain a
 known con artist behavior. traders on stamp auctions, and site for victims of fraudulent
 When fraudulent goods are can recall characteristics of beanie baby transactions to
 sold, they bid with evocative previously encountered traders visit. Traderlist members
 names to signal fraudulent and stamps. SCADS mem- mediate trading disputes,
 behavior. bers alert the trading com- When sufficient evidence is
 munity when stamps reappear gathered, they present con
 in modified form, or traders crete evidence to police,
 behave aberrantly. thereby increasing the likeli
 hood that police will respond.
 Relationship to Authority Adversarial. Authorities treat Distant. Authorities dismiss Cooperative. Police rely on
 Vigilantes as non-desirable. information from SCADS evidence obtained by
 members. Authorities only act Traderlist. Traderlist seeks
 when pressured from multiple legal recourse for its
 sources. problems.
 Relationship within Mixed. Many agree with Positive to distant. Difficult for Mainly positive. Members are
 Trading Community Vigilante effects, although they at-large community member to trusted by community. How
 may disapprove of their appreciate community knowl- ever, some disagree with
 methods. edge. However, once commu- methods employed.
 nity knowledge is understood,
 response is more positive.
 Relationship to Have received death threats. Have received threats of Have received threats of
 Criminals lawsuit._lawsuit._
 we judged that our use of archived comments would not
 breach any ethical principles.
 For data obtained from private sources, such as interviews and
 respondents' personal documents, we informed all respon
 dents of our intention to publish our research. We invited
 respondents to contribute to a research study and revealed the
 first author's identity, e-mail addresses, and personal website.
 Earlier drafts of this paper and one other published paper were
 also sent to interview subjects, who provided comments.
 Interview subjects were thus aware of how their contributions
 had been used. None of the respondents, to our knowledge,
 felt deceived. We were unable to contact two of the respon
 dents to obtain permission to use their data and therefore do
 not include their comments in reporting our results.
 Results i
 In this section, we present analyses of three anticrime com
 munities that illustrate how these communities reacted to
 Internet auction fraud, and how those reactions were related
 to the actions of authorities. Table 5 summarizes our main
 findings.
 Vigilante
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines a vigilante as
 a member of a self-appointed group of citizens who
 undertake law enforcement in their community with
 out legal authority, typically because the legal
 agencies are thought to be inadequate.
 In the trading community, the term referred to the Vigilante
 anticrime community, but the term was rarely used by
 Vigilantes to describe themselves. When asked to review
 drafts of our research, several Vigilantes expressed discomfort
 with the term, preferring a word like hunter instead.
 However, all Vigilantes interviewed agreed that others
 applied the term to their community.
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 Clan control. To better understand Vigilante practices, we
 identified Vigilantes on two large auction houses (eBay and
 Yahoo) and tracked their activities during June and July 2002.
 On Yahoo, it was easy to track Vigilantes, because they were
 openly organized and followed standard practices. For
 example, one Vigilante identified a suspicious auction and
 gathered evidence that the seller's telephone number was false
 and the mailing address was a post office box. Consequently,
 the Vigilante requested specific information about the item
 being auctioned, such as the manufacturer's serial number,
 from the seller and investigated the con artist's activities in
 another auction site. The results of the Vigilante's investi
 gation were posted on a Yahoo bulletin board:
 Check out the bull he gives in the questions asked!
 Guess who was there too... (he's quick). Don't know
 if it was listed, but his email doesn 't work and he
 tells everyone PayPal insures your payment to
 $100,000 (yeah sure). (Yahoo BBS Post, June 23,
 2002)
 Vigilantes often worked together. When one Vigilante
 detected a likely fraud, other Vigilantes interfered with the
 auction using a trading account with a suggestive name (e.g.,
 "sellerequalsscammer"). These actions informed the
 trading community that the auction was suspected as fraudu
 lent. Vigilantes also interfered with suspicious auctions by
 ending them, either by bidding obscenely high amounts or by
 using the "buy-it-now" feature to buy the good at a seller
 established fixed price. Of course, Vigilantes did not intend
 to pay for goods that, they assumed, did not exist. The illegal
 purchase was rather a move to protect unsuspecting buyers
 who might otherwise purchase the same goods from the con
 artist. As one admiring trader posted,
 You peofpjle have been hammering all over the
 scammers auctions in the high price laptop and
 cameras!. ..Everyone is getting all kinds of questions
 thrown at them from escrow refusals to serial
 numbers....WAY TO GO!!! WOOOOHOOOOH
 (Yahoo BBS user, January 24, 2002)
 On eBay, Vigilante activities were less blatant. Although
 they disclosed themselves to the community with suggestive
 names, Vigilantes did not organize via the eBay bulletin board
 because eBay employees actively monitored the boards.
 However, when we requested information about fraud on
 eBay, various individuals who monitored Vigilante activity
 directed us to suspicious eBay auctions that Vigilantes had
 sabotaged.
 Most Vigilante activity that we observed occurred in auctions
 for high-priced consumer items like computers and plasma
 TVs. Many shoppers for high-priced consumer items were
 transient members of a trading community because most
 individuals did not need to purchase multiples of such items.
 Many shoppers entered these auctions to obtain expensive
 goods at substantial discounts and unwittingly became targets
 of con artists who stealthily watched auctions to find novice
 bidders. Vigilantes rescued these people. The following
 quote refers to auctions that one Vigilante had sabotaged,
 leading to a mock celebration over the nonexistent goods that
 he had acquired:
 Yeah, I am living LARGE!!! I've got myself a few
 dozen Rolex watches, a roomful of Plasma TVs,
 enough DV camcorders to conquer Hollywood,
 XBOXes up the wazoo, and my own flesh-&-blood
 RO mail-order nymphet! (Yahoo BBS, July 8,
 2002)
 Vigilantes were able to identify con artists because they ac
 quired knowledge not held by authorities or transient traders.
 Social disorganization theory emphasizes the importance of
 community knowledge that originates from deep involvement
 in community activities. This knowledge included an under
 standing of the modus operandi of typical con artists. Vigi
 lantes knew, for example, that con artists usually advertised
 a diverse array of goods to attract the maximum number of
 buyers in a short amount of time. Con artists also vanished
 soon after successful frauds so that the defrauded buyer could
 not find them. This did not prevent them from reappearing
 under new trading names. Most long-term traders in the high
 priced consumables markets knew to avoid con artists based
 on such cues. However, con artists preyed on transients who
 lacked community knowledge. In the following posting, a
 transient trader was berated for being unfamiliar with the risks
 of trading:
 Tell me, what was it about this seller's feedback that
 made you feel comfortable sending him money?
 Was it his reputation? Was it the comments from
 previous customers? I'm also curious why you did
 not use an Escrow service, as eBay recommends, on
 a transaction this large? Why you did not use a
 credit card that would offer chargeback protection
 in case of a problem? (EBay BBS posting, July 12,
 2002)
 Attachment. We obtained clear evidence to support our
 expectation, based on social disorganization theory, that
 Vigilantes were strongly attached to their trading commu
 nities. One Vigilante whom we interviewed stated that, on his
 regular seller ID, he had sold "over 20,000 items," suggesting
 his long term participation in the community. Vigilante
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 activities were important to attached members and consumed
 a substantial proportion of their time. Private documents
 provided by Vigilantes revealed that they sometimes spent
 months monitoring con artists to obtain information like their
 addresses and bank account numbers.
 Relationship with authority. Although con artists' practices
 were well known to members of the Vigilante community, the
 auction houses were apparently unwilling to invest sufficient
 resources into the same kind of monitoring activity. The
 authority of the auction house was also limited to enforcement
 against illegal actions. While the posting of numerous high
 priced consumer items by a seller with a low reputation score
 raised suspicions, it was not illegal, so the auction house had
 insufficient grounds for intervention. Thus, Vigilantes used
 the knowledge gained from monitoring to protect the com
 munity in cases where the formal authority of auction houses
 was restrained.
 Because Vigilante action to spoil suspicious auctions usurped
 the authority of the auction house, auction houses frequently
 suspended Vigilantes:
 While eBay appreciates the spirit, the tactic is
 against site rules, and many vigilantes are sus
 pended for doing it. (MSNBC Interview, July 29,
 2002)
 Auction houses appeared justified in punishing Vigilantes
 because exuberant Vigilantes sometimes mistakenly disrupted
 legitimate auctions. However, auction house authorities had
 no foolproof method for confirming or refuting a member's
 honesty or intentions. For this reasons, Vigilantes persisted
 in their efforts to identify and punish con artists directly.
 Not all Vigilante tactics involved interference with auctions
 in progress. Vigilantes also warned members of the trading
 community about con artists' tactics, such as the use of
 fraudulent escrow services. To protect buyers purchasing
 high priced items, auction houses recommended the use of
 escrow intermediaries that held payment until buyers verified
 satisfaction with goods received. However, many con artists
 defrauded traders by offering escrow services that were
 simply shell companies owned by the con artists. In response,
 Vigilantes listed illegitimate escrows as a community service,
 as the following post indicates:
 Warning. Per request of one of the members we are
 posting the known fake escrow sites here. There
 have been a lot of scams running for Plasma TV's,
 Laptops, Camera's and several other high priced
 auctions using escrow only as a payment. These are
 fake and a new type of scam. They will give you a
 site to use and will refuse a valid escrow service. If
 you have any questions as to the authenticity of an
 escrow service that you are asked to use please
 email one of the members on the board or leave a
 reply here. (Yahoo BBS, June 22, 2002)
 The adversarial relationship with authority should not imply
 that Vigilantes always avoided direct contact. Vigilantes
 sometimes communicated their concerns directly to auction
 authorities. Some Vigilantes also attended the annual eBay
 conference to lobby in person for changes in auction house
 policies.
 Relationship within trading community. Trading community
 members regarded Vigilantes with mixed feelings. Many
 traders appreciated the Vigilantes' efforts because they
 reduced the overall level of fraud:
 [Name withheld], editor and publisher of [name
 withheld], an online newsletter about Internet
 auctions, said she was not a vigilante but she
 sympathized with their cause. (New York Times,
 March 20, 2004)
 However, many auction participants disagreed with Vigilante
 methods:
 Lawlessness is the problem, no matter how you
 rationalize it. Don't flatter yourself into thinking
 your efforts are changing anything, as long as you
 do what you do under cover of a fake ID, you are
 part of the problem, not part of the solution. (EBay
 BBS Posting, July 12, 2002)
 Relationship with criminals. Criminals disliked Vigilantes
 and acted in numerous ways to counter their actions. For
 example, con artists complained to the auction houses, issued
 death threats, and impersonated Vigilantes to defame them.
 According to one news report about a Vigilante,
 During the past 18 months, she's received a couple
 of threatening e-mails like [name withheld],
 including one saying (T'm going to stab your wife. "
 She wasn 't scared that time, since she has no wife.
 (MSNBC News, July 29, 2002)
 Stamp Collectors Against
 Dodgy Sellers (SCADS)
 Our second case, the community of Stamp Collectors Against
 Dodgy Sellers (SCADS), originated on the eBay discussion
 forums when a number of stamp traders reported that stamps
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 with low value were being purchased, altered to resemble
 rarer varieties of the same stamps, and resold at much higher
 prices. eBay initially rejected these reports, noting that eBay
 staff lacked the expertise to determine whether a stamp was
 authentic or fake. Moreover, eBay maintained that it was not
 in the business of authenticating merchandise for sale:
 eBay is only a venue, according to the eBay User
 Agreement. It doesn 't get to see the items offered by
 sellers, and as such cannot authenticate them. It is
 up to buyers to find out all they can about items,
 sellers and the terms of sale before they bid and
 complete the transaction, (www.sheryll.net/
 Forgeries/Forgeries_article.htm, undated)
 When SCADS members began to warn stamp traders on
 eBay's stamp forum, eBay censored the posts because they
 were in violation of eBay's rule that an auction member
 should not interfere with another member's auctions. The
 censoring of the eBay forums prompted the movement of
 SCADS to members' personal websites. By going to desig
 nated sites, traders could obtain descriptions of specific
 frauds, including sellers' auction IDs and photos of stamps
 before and after fraudulent alteration.
 Persisting in their efforts to fight fraud without eBay's
 support, SCADS managed to shut down con artists when
 MSNBC published an article exposing stamp fraud on eBay
 (Brunker 2002). The article prompted eBay to act, and over
 the next two years eBay used evidence from SCADS to shut
 down several individuals involved in stamp alteration.
 Clan control. Unlike the Vigilante community, SCADS did
 not directly engage with con artists. Instead, SCADS' chief
 control mechanism was the dissemination of information via
 websites and bulletin boards. Information presented was very
 detailed, and often contained photographs of the original and
 altered stamps with distinguishing characteristics highlighted.
 The main obstacle to SCADS' information dissemination was
 the difficulty of identifying frauds accurately. Because stamp
 fraud required skills and special equipment to alter stamps
 successfully, few individuals actually committed stamp fraud,
 and SCADS members needed to distinguish those individuals
 from the honest majority. As one reporter for a stamp
 magazine noted,
 In researching cancellations, I found that, some
 times, modern "commemorative " cancels duplicate
 the appearance of the cancel from the time of the
 event being commemorated. Contact with a de
 signer and promoter of special event covers led me
 to a commemorative cancel used for a Nebraska
 special cover around ten or twenty years ago.
 Although the cancel had a current date on it, the rest
 of its appearance was that of a 19th century cancel.
 I took the rubber stamp and proceeded to experi
 ment with different ink colors, eventually settling
 upon a mixture of mainly red, but a bit of brown to
 create a slightly more orange color. Applying the
 rubber stamp cancellation in such a way as to show
 only the 19th century design and not the 20th
 century date. Voila! There you have the stamp pic
 tured in this article and on the front page of Linn's.5
 (Professional Stamp Experts, April 21 1999)
 SCADS members detected con artists through their deviation
 from normal community practices. For example, a previously
 unknown trader who demonstrated ignorance of stamps in
 general would be suspected if offering a lot containing
 multiple rare stamps found in the basement of a new house.
 Community members knew such a find was extremely
 unlikely. As serious stamp collectors, SCADS members pos
 sessed rich knowledge not widely held in the broader stamp
 trading community. Through experience, they learned the
 differences between valuable and ordinary stamps and the
 most likely ways a stamp could be forged or altered. SCADS
 members were able to identify fraudulent alterations by
 observing ancillary physical characteristics such as tears,
 pinpricks, or stains. SCADS members constantly monitored
 auctions to see when a stamp purchased in one auction had
 been altered and resold in another. Using this knowledge, it
 was possible to expose con artists masquerading as naive
 traders selling rare stamps found "in the basement" or
 elsewhere.
 Attachment. Like Vigilantes, SCADS members were long
 time members of their trading community. In fact, strong
 attachment to the community was a prerequisite for being a
 SCADS member. To identify fraudulent stamps, one needed
 to know which stamps were rare and which were common,
 understand who was active in the trading community, and
 spot trading patterns across multiple auction listings. Such
 knowledge took a long time to acquire:
 I've learned that once someone shows you how to
 look for these characters, then they just jump out at
 you. (Someday I hope to be so good on the forgeries
 that don't have these tell-tale characters!)
 (StampChat discussion, March 15, 2005)
 Such knowledge could only be obtained by someone with
 long-time experience in the community.
 Linn's is one of the most popular stamp newspapers.
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 Relationship with authority. SCADS members' early experi
 ences with the eBay authorities made them skeptical of
 eBay's willingness to help control stamp fraud. Although
 eBay demonstrated greater tolerance at times, it also exercised
 its authority whenever it wished. For this reason, SCADS
 board members maintained independent sites so that members
 would be assured of an independent voice:
 This board seems very much affected by the posting
 climate on the eBay board. For the present, the
 eBay board is quite lenient, allowing all sorts of
 posts that, during its stricter regimes, are removed
 immediately. I think the need for this board be
 comes somewhat diminished during those lenient
 periods. However, it becomes the refuge for those
 posters when the eBay pendulum swings back the
 other way. (StampChat discussion, March 20,2005)
 Like Vigilantes, SCADS members remained skeptical of
 authority's ability to handle problems.
 We spotted [username withheld] as deceptive right
 away, but it took eBay a year and a half to figure it
 out. Wow, do you think we have psychic powers or
 something?...Like maybe in their next life eBay can
 be a giant septic service company and they can be
 hired as SCUBA divers. (StampChat discussion,
 May 4, 2005)
 We found some evidence, however, that SCADS members
 had begun to cooperate more with authorities. In September
 2003, eBay agreed with the American Philatelic Society to
 identify ways to reduce fraud in eBay's stamp auctions. One
 result of that agreement was the formation of a Stamp
 Community Watch (SCW). Initial responses to the SCW pro
 gram were negative, primarily because of administrative
 bottlenecks. Reports were being sent directly to eBay's trust
 and safety group (Safeharbor) instead of SCW.
 Collectors reporting questionable non- US items saw
 no evidence that their reports were being acted on
 by eBay Customer Support, the SCW or the APS. At
 the end of July, board members contacted new
 eBay.com Stamps category manager [name with
 held], who responded that he would check to see
 that there are no bottlenecks in the reporting
 process, (http://www.scads.org/ebay/ebay_aps.htm)
 Later postings about SCW were more positive, and the
 SCADS website provided more precise information to help
 stamp collectors report information to the SCW. The website
 told sellers to avoid the eBay complaint link, directed sellers
 to the SCW link, and instructed sellers what to say. For
 example, the website advised stamp collectors to use the term
 fraud, not stolen image, because the latter might be mis
 interpreted as a copyright violation. This more cooperative
 relationship with authority suggests that, in terms of the stages
 of social disorganization theory, SCADS may have been
 moving from the stage of resolution toward a more inter
 dependent community.
 Relationship within community. SCADS had a more favor
 able reputation within the stamp trading community than the
 Vigilantes had in the high-priced consumer items community.
 Although SCADS received criticism for "meddling" in the
 auctions of many people, the SCADS website was considered
 to be a great source of knowledge on stamp fraud. A search
 on Google for "stamp collectors against dodgy sellers"
 returned several thousand hits, most from websites not affi
 liated with SCADS. A substantial portion of those websites
 reported news articles related to SCADS-identified fraud.
 Relationship to criminals. Like Vigilantes, SCADS members
 were threatened by con artists. However, SCADS members
 were more cautious and mindful of authority's ability to
 retaliate. SCADS members chose to disseminate information
 instead of breaking the law by interfering directly with
 suspected fraudulent auctions. As one leader of the SCADS
 community posted,
 Contact after the auction is completed is also
 hazardous, because of laws which prevent third
 parties from interfering with the completion of a
 contract. I have heard from lawyers on the chats
 that in this case, TRUTH IS NOT A DEFENSE, and
 the harmed party can sue for the lost revenue.
 (George Kopecky, Discussion, July 9, 2002)
 Traderlist
 The third case is Traderlist, an anticrime community that
 combats fraud by listing on its website the IDs of good and
 bad traders, primarily of beanie baby bears and other Ty, Inc.
 products. Beanies are animal-shaped soft toys stuffed with
 plastic pellets (beans) and manufactured in limited quantities,
 which helps make them collectible items on resale markets.
 Beanies are manufactured with two identifying tags, a "tush
 tag," similar to the tag found on the collar of clothing, and a
 heart-shaped "swing tag" affixed to an ear of most beanies.
 Beanie toys with intact tags are more valuable than those
 whose tags are removed or that show other signs of wear.
 Because they are produced in limited quantities and become
 collectors' items, beanie toys are counterfeited and sold by
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 fraudulent traders. Traderlist began as an e-mail newsletter
 after the founding member, Cindy Bungard, was defrauded.
 After launching her newsletter, Bungard received numerous
 e-mails from other defrauded victims, prompting her to move
 her newsletter to the Web. Other individuals volunteered time
 for various roles (e.g., to mediate disputes, authenticate parti
 cular beanies, give advice), and Traderlist became an estab
 lished part of the Internet beanie baby auction community.
 Clan control. Traderlist was so named because it maintained
 a list of good and bad traders. A person was listed as a good
 trader by first paying a small sum to be registered ($ 15 for the
 first year, and $10 for each year thereafter). Once a trader
 was registered, others were invited to rate the trader for each
 transaction. The good trader list thus worked in a fashion
 similar to the reputation mechanisms used in most Internet
 auctions and many fixed-priced markets. Unlike those repu
 tation mechanisms, however, Traderlist was independent of
 auction house authority.
 Traderlist's bad trader list was populated by traders who had
 received complaints from other traders. When a complaint
 was received, Traderlist's mediators investigated the allega
 tion. If the investigation suggested a problem with the auc
 tion, the trader's ID appeared on the bad trader list with an
 explanation and a copy of the original complaint. At no addi
 tional charge, Traderlist mediators also acted in the interests
 of the aggrieved party. For example, mediators contacted
 alleged perpetrators to negotiate terms of a settlement. If mul
 tiple victims were involved, mediators aggregated evidence
 and worked with police to apprehend the criminal. Police
 frequently refused to investigate isolated incidences of fraud
 involving beanie bears because the financial damages were
 deemed too small. The following exchange between a trader
 and a Traderlist investigator illustrates how the anticrime
 community worked:
 June 21, 2002
 Complaint filed by: [name withheld]
 I need help with a bad trade. [Long description of
 trade follows] Please let me know what to do next or
 if you can help. Many thanks, [victim]
 July 2, 2002
 Cautionlist emailed [perpetrator] many times and
 although she received the email she deleted it with
 out reading it. I put all the info in the subject about
 what the email was about so she would be aware it
 was a bad trader's complaint. We both have aol
 [America Online] so I can check status if she reads
 my email or not. So knowing this she deleted it all
 before reading it. But she is well aware that I was
 investigating the complaints.
 Attachment. As in the Vigilante and SCADS cases, members
 of Traderlist were strongly attached to their trading com
 munity and were regarded as trustworthy. For example, one
 Traderlist member used the name "Grandma Pat" and
 assumed the role of an advice columnist. Another was a
 recognized expert on beanie products, and owners mailed
 beanies to her to be authenticated for a small fee. The
 authentication process was described as follows:
 A numbered certificate of authenticity will be
 assigned to your Beanie?. 3. The Beanie? will be
 placed with its certificate in a sturdy, Lucite case
 (shown in this picture). 4. The Beanie? case will be
 sealed with a tamper evident tape. Your Beanie?
 will be shipped back within 2 -3 business days of
 receipt of the Beanie?, (http://www.peggyg.com/
 authenticity.asp, undated)
 Relationship with authority. Unlike the other two cases,
 members of Traderlist cooperated with authority. Traderlist
 members frequently assisted auction houses with investi
 gations and respected their rules. In one incident, a purported
 con artist served Traderlist members with a court injunction,
 which forced the site to close down. Traderlist members
 resolved this issue through the courts, which overturned the
 injunction 2 months later.
 Relationship within community. Traderlist members were
 mostly respected by the trading community. Defrauded
 buyers assisted by Traderlist were grateful for the opportunity
 to contribute names to the bad trader list. However, some
 segments of the trading community were potentially harmed
 by Traderlist. By giving more voice to defrauded buyers,
 sellers lost power, making some legitimate sellers uncom
 fortable. As one collector posted,
 What worries me is that the "bad trader" lists have
 no set controls or criteria. A person could land on a
 bad trader list from one false complaint from a com
 petitor trying to discredit him. (rec.collecting.cards.
 discuss, June 17, 1996)
 Although Traderlist only contacted sellers when buyers
 explicitly requested contact, accused sellers were sometimes
 unable to complete a transaction for legitimate reasons. One
 listed bad trader provided the following information to
 explain his inability to return money to unhappy buyers.
 Hello, I will be contacting PayPal this afternoon in
 an attempt to resolve [name withheld] case as well
 as a few others. My account has been locked with
 PayPal and they have made it very difficult for me to
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 resolve these issues but I now have a contact there
 that is working with me directly to return their
 money... (Traderlist reply, May 10, 2002)
 Some frauds were also conducted using the name of an in
 nocent third party with a good reputation. In these frauds, the
 con artist usurped the name and reputation of an honest trader
 to convince shoppers of his or her legitimacy. Traderlist
 helped these honest traders with clarifying posts to its web
 site, as in the following example:
 [Comp any name] in Georgia is in no way connected
 to [comp any name] in Maine. [Companyname] in
 Georgia is a reputable company with positive feed
 back under [usernamejon eBay. (Traderlist
 moderator note, undated)
 Relationship with criminals. The prominence of Traderlist
 members as community activists exposed them to retaliation
 by con artists. As described above, a purported con artist
 served Traderlist members with an injunction, which resulted
 in Traderlist members incurring legal expenses, which were
 partially offset by donations from the trading community.
 Undaunted, Traderlist pursued the case, which ended in the
 arrest and prosecution of the parties who served the
 injunction.
 IMPORTANT UPDATE APRIL 12, 2005
 [name withheld] get jail time in fraud case ...
 Note from mediator, [name withheld].
 Our readers will remember these are the people who
 had Traderlist removed from the internet for two
 months last year by threatening me and our web
 hosts with lawsuits. The above sentence concerns
 bankruptcy fraud. The [name withheld] still face
 federal indictments. The complaints against [com
 pany name withheld] are still being investigated,
 and records are being subpoenaed. (Traderlist.com
 posting)
 Discussion ^^ ^HI^H
 Our research sought answers to three questions related to the
 role of communities in Internet auction fraud. Table 6 pre
 sents these research questions again and summarizes the
 answers generated by our research.
 In answer to the first research question, we found that
 communities play a critical role in managing Internet auction
 fraud by identifying and acting upon suspicious auction
 activity. The clan controls employed by anticrime communi
 ties cannot be easily duplicated by authorities. For example,
 community members who continuously observe trades in par
 ticular commodities can discover abnormal bidding patterns
 involving pairs of buyers and sellers, supporting the suspicion
 that the pairs are confederates in a shilling scam. Because
 addressing fraud requires such intimate knowledge, anti-fraud
 communities typically comprise members with strong attach
 ments to the community. Transient members may perceive
 fraud as a rare and random occurrence and may be willing to
 accept trading risks due to their low trading volume. In con
 trast, strongly attached community members may earn their
 livelihoods through high volume trading. When they encoun
 ter con artists, attached members are motivated to form anti
 crime communities and spread knowledge about con artists to
 other community members. Thus, anticrime communities not
 only possess intimate knowledge about fraud, but they also
 use that knowledge to protect their interests and to sustain the
 broader trading community.
 In answer to the second research question, we found a variety
 of ways in which communities relate to authority. Although
 authorities lack the intimate knowledge required to identify
 potential fraud, they have capabilities that communities lack.
 For example, authorities may expel criminals from the com
 munity by suspending their trading and/or payment accounts.
 Our findings portray the relationship between community and
 authority at three levels of community development. In the
 dissatisfied community, Vigilantes defied authority by taking
 the law into their own hands. They intervened, often illegally,
 in auctions in order to spoil them. In this way, Vigilantes
 drove con artists away and protected unsuspecting community
 members. However, victimized traders often turned to author
 ities for restitution because Vigilantes could not assist them
 after fraudulent trades had been completed. The resolved
 SCADS community educated trading community members
 about fraud and worked in parallel with authorities rather than
 fully cooperating with them. In the stamp trading community,
 victims sought advice from SCADS yet also saw the auction
 houses as their primary source of restitution for completed
 frauds. Finally, the interdependent Traderlist community not
 only educated community members but also enlisted the help
 of authorities in investigating and prosecuting con artists.
 Traderlist's capacity to assemble fraud cases and present
 convinc ng evidence to authorities made them an effective
 source of assistance. Our study thus affirms the associations
 between the stages of community development, community
 relationships with authority, and a community's collective
 efficacy in managing crime (Nolan et al. 2004).
In response o our third research question, we draw practical
 recommendat n bout the management of Internet auction
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 Table 6. Summary of Research Questions and Answers
 What mechanisms do communities Communities generally are highly adept at monitoring crime. They are less able to
 employ to manage Internet auction enforce rules.
 fraud?
 Dissatisfied communities may enforce rules by employing Vigilante tactics to take the
 law into their own hands.
 Resolved communities do not attempt to enforce rules, but disseminate information
 on crime to the community.
 Interdependent communities disseminate information. However, they can also call on
 authority to enforce rules.
 How do community responses to Dissatisfied communities contradict the efforts of authorities.
 Internet auction fraud relate to
 responses by authorities? Resolved communities do not maintain close or consistent ties with authorities. They
 may disparage, cooperate with, and work in parallel with authorities on separate
 days.
 Interdependent communities manifest collective efficacy by cooperating with
 authorities and sharing community knowledge with them.
 What practical implications can be Auction fraud can be addressed more effectively through the complementary efforts
 drawn for the management of of community and authority. Authorities should cultivate cooperative relationships
 Internet auction fraud? with online communities and facilitate the development of their collective efficacy.
 fraud. The primary implication for practice is that authorities
 can be more effective if they cultivate cooperative relation
 ships with communities rather than oppose them. Given that
 interdependent communities actively cooperate with author
 ities in combating crime, auction houses should seek ways to
 strengthen their interdependence with anticrime communities.
 For example, rather than banishing SCADS from eBay
 because of its criticism of auction house policies, eBay could
 have worked with SCADS earlier. SCADS did not vanish
 after eBay's censorship; it merely moved to independent sites
 on the Internet where it continued its activities as a resolved
 community. Auction houses can potentially overcome their
 resource and knowledge limitations by working actively with
 anticrime communities to manage Internet auction fraud.
 This practical suggestion does not imply that clan control
 should displace formal control, or that communities should be
 the dominant group to address fraud. Rather, both clan and
 formal control should be employed to manage the shared
 interest in reducing Internet auction fraud. As Newman and
 Clarke (2003) advised, "Auction sites should do whatever
 they can to provide incentives for customers to participate in
 these online community watch sites, and make freely avail
 able all the feedback made concerning the records of all
 individual buyers and sellers" (p. 128). Because community
 members and auction houses both stand to benefit from the
 reduction of fraud, it seems worthwhile to harmonize their
 efforts and resources.
 Theoretical Contribution
 Our use of social disorganization theory to analyze online
 anticrime communities demonstrates that the theory, origi
 nally developed to analyze geographically bounded commu
 nities, can be adapted for the analysis of online communities.
 In extending the theory beyond its original domain of appli
 cation, however, we highlight two areas where modifications
 to the theory are needed.
 First, the literature on social disorganization theory generally
 considers criminals to be members of the community, in part
 because they share geographic territory with other members.
 Criminals are seen as deviant members who might be
 reformed, and the social disorganization literature emphasizes
 moral education of a community's youthful members (Nielsen
 et al. 2005; Osgood and Anderson 2004). However, criminals
 were definitely not considered members of the online auction
 trading communities that we studied, and we noticed no
 attempts at moral education aimed at reforming criminals.
 Indeed, the goals of anticrime activists in online trading
 seemed to be expulsion of criminals and education of other
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 members. For these reasons, we suggest that criminals be
 theoretically positioned as an external threat to online com
 munities rather than as members. Anticrime communities
 operating online should not be predicted to engage in moral
 education to reform criminals. Rather, we would expect their
 focus to be expulsion and/or punishment of perpetrators.
 Second, the concept of attachment to communities defined by
 geographical boundaries is usually reflected by the length of
 time that members live within community boundaries (Kane
 2002; Nielsen et al. 2005; Schulenberg 2003). However,
 online communities are not spatially bound, and members
 may move freely between communities or belong to several
 communities simultaneously. In the absence of physical
 barriers limiting the mobility of community members, the
 concept of neighborhood attachment should be modified to
 accommodate the conditions of online communities. We
 suggest that attachment in online communities has at least two
 dimensions: a temporal dimension, reflecting the length of
 time that an individual has participated in the community, and
 a value dimension, reflecting commitment to the normative
 interests of the community. Empirically, the temporal dimen
 sion of attachment could be determined by the length of time
 a member has actively participated in the community, as
 indicated by the date of initial registration or the date of first
 postings on community bulletin boards. Ongoing activity
 could also be assessed by looking at the level of trading
 volume and number of reputation scores obtained.
 However, such indicators would not necessarily rule out con
 artists, especially those patient enough to establish a favorable
 track record in preparation for a future "sting." Thus, a
 second dimension is also needed to define attachment of
 members to online trading communities. Commitment to the
 values shared by a community is evidenced by the character
 of one's activity over time. Although traders are assumed to
 be self-interested insofar as they seek personal objectives,
 self-interested traders also share values that trading processes
 be fair, honest, and relatively transparent. Such value posi
 tions could be assessed by looking at member activities that
 align with community norms. For example, members who
 participate actively on bulletin boards or who play specific
 roles are likely to be more attached than other traders.
 Traderlist's advice columnist, "Grandma Pat," and others who
 compile chronologies of a suspected criminal's activities all
 play roles that are not only consistent with community values,
 but also help to perpetuate those values.
 Taken together, the temporal and value dimensions of
 attachment would appear to align with social disorganization
 theory's interest in identifying non-transient members with
 definite stakes in the future of the community, whether or not
 they share geographical space.
 Further Insights
 Beyond these extensions to social disorganization theory, we
 draw two additional insights from our analysis into issues that
 are not clearly addressed by the theory: the relationship
 between clan control and community knowledge, and the
 impact of commodity characteristics on community control
 mechanisms.
 As discussed above, our results focus directly upon the capa
 city of communities to exercise informal clan control in their
 efforts to govern their own affairs, with or without coopera
 tion from authorities. In exercising clan control, community
 knowledge plays an important role. We have shown how
 communities are effective at monitoring criminal activity and
 producing knowledge about fraud that authorities would have
 neither the time nor expertise to produce. This base of knowl
 edge is an important factor in making clan control effective.
 In addition to the shared values that most scholars emphasize
 when discussing clan control (Adler and Kwon 2002; Ouchi
 1980; Silver and Miller 2004), we suggest that clan control
 becomes more effective when based upon community knowl
 edge. This insight is consistent with earlier renditions of
 social disorganization theory, in which community knowledge
 is referred to as fugitive knowledge, in contrast to the codified
 knowledge held by authorities (Hill 2004).
 In each of the cases in our study, community knowledge
 allowed community members to formulate specific strategies
 for combating con artists. Vigilantes spent countless hours
 tracking suspicious activities, which allowed them to target
 specific auctions to spoil or expose. Without the knowledge
 to choose targets, Vigilante tactics would have been reckless
 and inconsistent with the process of orderly trading. Like
 wise, stamp experts in SCADS and beanie toy experts in
 Traderlist drew from deep wells of knowledge to distinguish
 between authentic and counterfeit items offered for sale.
 Such knowledge allowed community members to exercise
 more effective clan control by educating novice traders about
 the risks inherent in bidding for items online. In both cases,
 community knowledge supplemented shared values in
 effecting community governance.
 Second, it is worthwhile to speculate about the relationship
 between community action and the characteristics of items
 traded in Internet auctions. SCADS and Traderlist were
 similar because they traded in collectible items. In the stamp
 auctions, the supply of valuable stamps is limited by the
 scarce occurrence of interesting misprints and the ignorance
 about valuable items by noncollectors, who might discard
 them. In the beanie toy auctions, short production runs make
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 each product more valuable. In auctions for these collectible
 goods, we saw communities actively producing and sharing
 knowledge about the products being traded. By contrast,
 Vigilantes operated in auctions for high-priced consumer
 goods, which are not collectible. For the Vigilante com
 munity, knowledge about trading patterns that seemed
 fraudulent was more important than knowledge about the
 commodities themselves. It may thus be that Internet auction
 fraud takes on separate characteristics in different trading
 communities. In response, anticrime communities for
 separate product types may also use distinct tactics to combat
 fraud. Further research on the relevance of product charac
 teristics could contribute additional empirical evidence to
 support our speculations.
 Overall, our research offers novel extensions to ideas
 originally formulated for geographically bounded com
 munities to the realm of online auction communities. Social
 disorganization theory's core concepts appear to be applicable
 to both geographically bounded neighborhoods and to online
 communities. In both settings, anticrime communities iden
 tify criminals and oppose their activities using such
 mechanisms as vigilante justice, community education, and
 cooperation with authorities. In both settings, communities
 generate knowledge that authorities generally lack. Our
 analysis suggests that clan control based on community
 knowledge is an effective way to manage Internet auction
 fraud, especially when combined with the resources and
 power of formal authority.
 Conclusion
 This paper has addressed a significant contemporary problem
 that arises as an unintended consequence of using information
 technology to mediate economic transactions in auction
 markets. The innovative use of Internet technology to tran
 scend physical barriers of geographical space inadvertently
 establishes conditions that can be exploited by criminals
 intent on profiting from fraud (Newman and Clarke 2003).
 The high degree of anonymity and low barriers to entry and
 exit that characterize Internet auctions allow perpetrators of
 fraud to assume false and multiple identities, create deceptive
 information, transact fraudulent deals, and escape with little
 trace.
 The approach typically used to analyze Internet auction fraud
 in IS research is to explore the direct relationship between the
 buyer and seller. We have widened this perspective by
 applying social disorganization theory, which deals with
 community responses to crime. As Adler (2001) and others
 have observed, community governance may assume greater
 importance relative to markets and authorities in an infor
 mation economy. However, community governance does not
 replace other modes of governance, so it becomes important
 to understand how modes of governance operate together.
 Our analysis sheds light on the important relationship between
 formal and clan control in combating Internet auction fraud.
 We use social disorganization theory because of its specific
 focus on community development in relation to crime man
 agement. We empirically identified three separate levels of
 community development, each with a different relationship to
 authority in managing Internet auction fraud. Our findings
 extend the theory' s relevance beyond geographically bounded
 neighborhoods into the realm of unbounded online com
 munities. We suspect that social disorganization theory could
 also be exploited to analyze nonmarket online communities,
 such as those engaged in open source software development
 or entertainment. Although the presence of crime is not a
 primary concern in nonmarket communities, fraudulent mis
 representation of information may produce other adverse
 consequences. Social disorganization theory, as modified for
 online communities, provides insights into how fraudulent
 misrepresentations might be managed through community
 action.
 Our analysis complements analyses drawn from individual
 level theories by focusing on community efficacy in
 responding to fraud through clan control. Clan control has
 been acknowledged persistently in the literature as a means to
 mitigate opportunism in markets (Adler 2001; Ouchi 1980;
 Williamson 1996), but the relevance of these ideas to Internet
 auction fraud has yet to receive close study. Our analysis
 shows how clan and formal control may function inter
 dependently as a hybrid form of governance over economic
 transactions.
 Unlike most IS research on Internet auction fraud, our
 empirical approach has been intensive, investigating relatively
 few auction communities in depth using qualitative data
 analysis. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses.
 The primary strength is the ability to explore questions that
 have not been addressed previously, such as how online com
 munities respond to crime and how they relate to formal
 authority. The primary weakness of intensive research is the
 inability to generalize from the few cases studied to the larger
 population of online auction communities. However, to the
 extent that our analysis supports a theoretical understanding
 of community roles in Internet auctions, we make a more
 general theoretical contribution applicable in comparable
 settings (Lee and Baskerville 2003).
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 A second limitation concerns our inability to test the hypoth
 esized causal relationships in social disorganization theory.
 As our study lacks sufficient range of variation across cases
 to test hypotheses, this was not our objective. Indeed, our
 sampling criteria led us to select communities that were
 prominent in the fight against Internet auction fraud, thereby
 restricting the range of variation. This sampling strategy was
 chosen intentionally so that we could achieve depth in our
 understanding of anticrime communities at different levels of
 development. Clearly, the type of qualitative analysis that we
 employed is not suited to variance analysis (Mason 1996).
 Finally, our research suggests the benefits of greater co
 operation between anticrime communities and authority, yet
 we are unable to provide much insight into the antecedents of
 community efficacy. Future research could examine the con
 ditions leading to the formation of more advanced, inter
 dependent communities. We suspect that the relationship
 between communities and authority may be fragile, as evi
 denced in the case of SCADS's banishment from eBay
 bulletin boards. This move by auction authorities may have
 retarded SCADS's development toward a more interdepen
 dent relationship with eBay. Our data suggest that banish
 ment had lingering effects, leading us to classify SCADS as
 a resolved community, perhaps vacillating between conflict
 and cooperation with authority. Future research could study
 anticrime communities over longer periods of time, so that the
 process of their development could be observed and under
 stood more completely.
 As advances in information technologies enable the creation
 and success of business models such as Internet auctions,
 researchers should draw from a broader repertoire of theory
 to address issues pertaining to undesirable consequences such
 as fraud. Given the importance of community governance in
 the emerging knowledge economy (Adler 2001), appropriate
 theories of community need to be identified and applied to
 contemporary issues such as managing fraud and other
 crimes. Communities can play a viable and effective role in
 governing their own affairs, whether played out in geo
 graphical neighborhoods or online. Our application of social
 disorganization theory to Internet auctions represents a step
 toward more complete comprehension of the capability of
 online communities and auction authorities to manage fraud.
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